By Shoshana A. Grossbard, Jacob Mincer
This e-book examines the impression of marriage on hard work strength participation, productiveness at paintings, discount rates, govt courses, and lots of different facets of the economic climate. Lawmakers, criminal students, sociologists, psychologists, non secular leaders and all excited about threats to the establishment of marriage and the values that it embodies take advantage of this reexamination of a simple Western establishment through the lens economists.
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Additional info for Marriage and the Economy: Theory and Evidence from Advanced Industrial Societies
34 Production in the monetized economy is a function of the supply of labor. As workers choosing between Work-in-Marriage and labor force 34 unmarried, this may not be for lack of marriage-related productivity of higher education but for lack of institutions that make quasiwages for Work-in-Marriage more proportional to the productivity of the worker. As a result, many educated women choose to stay unmarried. Certain countries are more adept at getting college-educated women to form couples (and supply Work-in-Marriage) than others, possibly as the result of a system that compensates Work-in-Marriage more according to its productivity.
See Grossbard (1978). Bergmann (1995) has criticized Becker for arguing that women are better off under polygamy. On the idea that polygamous societies are more likely to have men restricting the freedom of young people to marry with mates of their own choice, see Marcia Guttentag and Paul F. Secord (1983). To test economic models of marriage, we need to compare societies giving their young the same freedom to choose a mate, or at least restricting that freedom to the same extent. Religions have much to say on these matters.
Chapter 5, by Frances Woolley, examines how marriage affects personal ﬁnances, her focus being a particular question: Who in a marriage controls the money? The chapter also contains a useful survey of recent 20 Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman developments in the study of intrahousehold resource allocation. Using a new Canadian survey of families with children, Woolley does not ﬁnd a systematic pro-male or pro-female bias in household ﬁnances. However she does ﬁnd that, as predicted by theory, partners with greater incomes have greater control over money, younger spouses do better, and less income pooling occurs when one partner, especially the man, has been married before.
Marriage and the Economy: Theory and Evidence from Advanced Industrial Societies by Shoshana A. Grossbard, Jacob Mincer