Download e-book for iPad: Standardization and Expectations (Lecture Notes in Economics by Tobias Langenberg

By Tobias Langenberg

ISBN-10: 3540281126

ISBN-13: 9783540281122

ISBN-10: 3540281134

ISBN-13: 9783540281139

Over the past a long time, technological growth has led to a large number of standardization difficulties. for example, compatibility criteria make sure the interoperability of products, that's of decisive value whilst clients face optimistic externalities in intake. shoppers' expectancies are key to the matter of even if a brand new know-how will succeed as de-facto common or no longer. Early adopters has to be convinced that the community sturdy can be winning. therefore, it can be helpful for companies to persuade shoppers' expectancies. which include 3 types on numerous points of standardization and expectancies, this booklet goals at deepening our realizing of ways criteria and expectancies have interaction. The versions are utilized to difficulties equivalent to "Inter-Technology vs. Intra-Technology pageant" and "Standardization of Nascent Technologies".

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Extra resources for Standardization and Expectations (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)

Sample text

The diploma. On the other hand, a type B employee who is confronted with relatively high requirements could be willing to leave the university without graduating. Thus, there would not exist a "pure" SSE any longer and the job-matching effect of signaling would deteriorate. By standardizing the requirements, for instance by means of central examinations or accreditation, signaling could recover its filtering fiinction. 1 Model Structure Suppose that for both worker types, the requirements y are uniformly distributed in the interval [m-d^m + d], where m stands for the mean value and d denotes the deviation with 0

A single type B employee would always deviate from the non-signaling strategy, even if all remaining type B workers chose non-signaling. Since the same is true for all type B members, there is no NSPE in this situation. In the case of 1 - /? (1 - 9) - ju, < 0 , multiple equilibria occur. If all type B members select the non-signaling strategy, a single type B employee has no incentive to deviate because the non-signaling payoff (}-p)a-\-p\qa-\-(\-q)b\ exceeds the signaling payoff, which is equal to Z> - |Li A.

4 illustrates the impact of substitutability on deterrence profits. If the degree of substitutability, y, is low, firm^^ needs a larger quantity in order to prevent the entry of technology B. Thus, starting with c^ = 1, the maximum deterrence profit H^ ^ * (c^^ ) and the zero point are reached faster. Fig. e. the deterrence profit always rises in n: dU\,* dn {a,-c,y >0. 21) Fig. 5 depicts this result. \fn approaches its upper limit « = 1, the deterrence profit is illustrated by a straight line.

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Standardization and Expectations (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems) by Tobias Langenberg

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